Preferences on Ranked-Choice Ballots

TL;DR

This paper models the lattice structure of ranked-choice ballots, revealing that voter preferences differ from previous assumptions and providing a foundation for analyzing strategic voting in future research.

Contribution

It formalizes the lattice structure of ranked-choice ballots and challenges prior assumptions about voter preferences in such elections.

Findings

Preferences form a lattice structure

Voter preferences differ from previous assumptions

Provides groundwork for strategic voting analysis

Abstract

This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of voters, which indicate that ranked-choice elections require different considerations for voters and candidates alike. While this model assumes that voters vote sincerely, the model of ranked-choice elections this paper presents allows for considerations of strategic voting in future work.