Near-Tight Algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant and Thiele Voting Rules
Krzysztof Sornat, Virginia Vassilevska Williams, Yinzhan Xu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a near-optimal, fast algorithm for the Chamberlin-Courant voting rule on single-peaked preferences, and extends the approach to nearly single-peaked profiles and Thiele rules, improving computational efficiency.
Contribution
It provides the first almost linear time algorithm for CC on single-peaked preferences and develops polynomial-time algorithms for nearly single-peaked profiles with candidate deletion.
Findings
Algorithm runs in almost linear time for single-peaked preferences.
Polynomial-time algorithm for CC with small candidate-deletion sets.
Extensions to Thiele rules with approval ballots.
Abstract
We present an almost optimal algorithm for the classic Chamberlin-Courant multiwinner voting rule (CC) on single-peaked preference profiles. Given voters and candidates, it runs in almost linear time in the input size, improving the previous best time algorithm of Betzler et al. (2013). We also study multiwinner voting rules on nearly single-peaked preference profiles in terms of the candidate-deletion operation. We show a polynomial-time algorithm for CC where a given candidate-deletion set has logarithmic size. Actually, our algorithm runs in time and the base of the power cannot be improved under the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis. We also adapt these results to all non-constant Thiele rules which generalize CC with approval ballots.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
