VSVC: Backdoor attack against Keyword Spotting based on Voiceprint Selection and Voice Conversion
Hanbo Cai, Pengcheng Zhang, Hai Dong, Yan Xiao, Shunhui Ji

TL;DR
This paper introduces VSVC, a backdoor attack method on voice keyword spotting systems that uses voiceprint selection and voice conversion to achieve high success rates with minimal training data poisoning.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel backdoor attack scheme, VSVC, exploiting voiceprint manipulation to implant backdoors in DNN-based keyword spotting models.
Findings
Achieves nearly 97% attack success rate in experiments
Requires poisoning less than 1% of training data
Effective across multiple victim models
Abstract
Keyword spotting (KWS) based on deep neural networks (DNNs) has achieved massive success in voice control scenarios. However, training of such DNN-based KWS systems often requires significant data and hardware resources. Manufacturers often entrust this process to a third-party platform. This makes the training process uncontrollable, where attackers can implant backdoors in the model by manipulating third-party training data. An effective backdoor attack can force the model to make specified judgments under certain conditions, i.e., triggers. In this paper, we design a backdoor attack scheme based on Voiceprint Selection and Voice Conversion, abbreviated as VSVC. Experimental results demonstrated that VSVC is feasible to achieve an average attack success rate close to 97% in four victim models when poisoning less than 1% of the training data.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSpeech Recognition and Synthesis · Topic Modeling · Music and Audio Processing
