Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: coordination and equilibrium selection
Tomasz Raducha, Maxi San Miguel

TL;DR
This paper investigates how multilayer networks influence synchronization and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games using evolutionary game theory, revealing critical thresholds and symmetry-breaking effects across different update rules.
Contribution
It introduces a novel multilayer network framework to study coordination and equilibrium selection, highlighting the impact of inter-layer connectivity and update rules.
Findings
Synchronization depends on inter-layer overlap $q$ and payoff difference $\
Multilayer structure enhances Pareto-optimal equilibrium prevalence.
Symmetry breaking leads to exclusive selection of payoff-dominant strategies.
Abstract
We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). Players interact on a two-layer random regular network. The population on each layer plays a different game, with layer I preferring the opposite strategy to layer II. We measure the difference between the two games played on the layers by a difference in payoffs while the inter-connectedness is measured by a node overlap parameter . We discover a critical value below which layers do not synchronise. For in general both layers coordinate on the same strategy. Surprisingly, there is a symmetry breaking in the selection of equilibrium -- for…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
