School Choice with Farsighted Students
Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism yields a matching that is both Pareto efficient and farsightedly stable in school choice problems, unlike the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism.
Contribution
It establishes that TTC provides a farsightedly stable and Pareto efficient matching, highlighting its advantages over DA in farsighted settings.
Findings
TTC matching forms a singleton farsighted stable set.
DA matching may not be part of any farsighted stable set.
Three steps ahead are sufficient for stabilizing TTC matchings.
Abstract
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSchool Choice and Performance · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth