Price & Choose

TL;DR

The paper introduces a two-stage mechanism called Price & Choose that ensures efficient outcomes in two-agent environments, extending to multiple players, non-quasi linear utilities, and robustness to strategic behaviors.

Contribution

It presents a novel mechanism that fully implements efficiency in complex settings, including multiple agents and non-quasi linear utilities, with considerations for fairness.

Findings

Mechanism achieves efficiency in two-agent settings.

Extended to multiple players and non-quasi linear utilities.

Addresses robustness to strategic max-min behavior.

Abstract

We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice, paying the corresponding price: Price \& Choose. We extend our implementation result in three main directions: an arbitrary number of players, non-quasi linear utilities, and robustness to max-min behavior. Finally, we discuss how to reduce the payoff inequality between players while still achieving efficiency.