On Zero-Knowledge Proofs over the Quantum Internet
Mark Carney

TL;DR
This paper introduces a quantum identity authentication protocol based on zero-knowledge proofs that leverages quantum states and channels, enhancing security for future quantum internet applications.
Contribution
It adapts classical zero-knowledge proof logic to quantum circuits, proposing a novel quantum authentication method based on quantum state estimation hardness.
Findings
Protocol detects eavesdropping and manipulation.
Provides security bounds for the quantum protocol.
Moves security assumptions from discrete logarithm to quantum state estimation.
Abstract
This paper presents a new method for quantum identity authentication (QIA) protocols. The logic of classical zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) due to Schnorr is applied in quantum circuits and algorithms. This novel approach gives an exact way with which a prover can prove they know some secret by encapsulating it in a quantum state before sending to a verifier by means of a quantum channel - allowing for a ZKP wherein an eavesdropper or manipulation can be detected with a fail-safe design. This is achieved by moving away from the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem towards the hardness of estimating quantum states. This paper presents a method with which this can be achieved and some bounds for the security of the protocol provided. With the anticipated advent of a `quantum internet', such protocols and ideas may soon have utility and execution in the real world.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security · Cryptography and Data Security · Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture
