Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Polity

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that in legislative decision-making, an agenda setter can secure her preferred outcome in equilibrium regardless of initial defaults, challenging traditional views on voter sophistication constraints.

Contribution

It introduces a new manipulability condition that explains the agenda setter's power in diverse policy spaces, including spatial and distributional settings.

Findings

Agenda setter achieves her favorite outcome in every equilibrium.

Voter sophistication alone does not limit agenda setter's power.

The manipulability condition applies broadly across policy spaces.

Abstract

This paper models legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated and the agenda setter cannot commit to her future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new condition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including spatial settings and distribution problems. Our results overturn the conventional wisdom that voter sophistication alone constrains an agenda setter's power.