Physical layer insecurity
Muriel M\'edard, Ken R. Duffy

TL;DR
This paper introduces the success exponent metric for finite block length security analysis and demonstrates how GRAND decoding can be exploited to compromise physical layer security in wireless communication.
Contribution
It proposes the success exponent as a new metric for assessing information leakage and shows how GRAND decoding can operationalize this metric to breach security.
Findings
Success exponents can evaluate Eve's decoding success probability.
GRAND decoding can be used to compromise security of various codes.
Simulation confirms practical vulnerability of physical layer security.
Abstract
In the classic wiretap model, Alice wishes to reliably communicate to Bob without being overheard by Eve who is eavesdropping over a degraded channel. Systems for achieving that physical layer security often rely on an error correction code whose rate is below the Shannon capacity of Alice and Bob's channel, so Bob can reliably decode, but above Alice and Eve's, so Eve cannot reliably decode. For the finite block length regime, several metrics have been proposed to characterise information leakage. Here we assess a new metric, the success exponent, and demonstrate it can be operationalized through the use of Guessing Random Additive Noise Decoding (GRAND) to compromise the physical-layer security of any moderate length code. Success exponents are the natural beyond-capacity analogue of error exponents that characterise the probability that a maximum likelihood decoding is correct when…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptographic Implementations and Security · Wireless Communication Security Techniques · Cryptography and Data Security
