Risks to Zero Trust in a Federated Mission Partner Environment
Keith Strandell, Sudip Mittal

TL;DR
This paper examines the risks of implementing Zero Trust Architectures in federated mission networks, focusing on identity model integration challenges and proposing mitigation strategies.
Contribution
It identifies specific risks in federated ZTA deployment and suggests two avenues for further investigation to enhance security.
Findings
Identified risks in integrating multiple identity models.
Proposed two potential mitigation strategies.
Highlighted importance of addressing federation-specific challenges.
Abstract
Recent cybersecurity events have prompted the federal government to begin investigating strategies to transition to Zero Trust Architectures (ZTA) for federal information systems. Within federated mission networks, ZTA provides measures to minimize the potential for unauthorized release and disclosure of information outside bilateral and multilateral agreements. When federating with mission partners, there are potential risks that may undermine the benefits of Zero Trust. This paper explores risks associated with integrating multiple identity models and proposes two potential avenues to investigate in order to mitigate these risks.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsService-Oriented Architecture and Web Services · Access Control and Trust · Distributed systems and fault tolerance
