CoMMA Protocol: Towards Complete Mitigation of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Attacks
Dev Churiwala, Bhaskar Krishnamachari

TL;DR
The paper introduces the CoMMA protocol, a two-phase transaction system designed to completely prevent MEV attacks by ensuring transaction order integrity and user protection in blockchain networks.
Contribution
It presents a novel two-phase protocol that guarantees the elimination of MEV attacks, with formal correctness proof and demonstrated effectiveness.
Findings
Protocol effectively prevents MEV attacks
Formal proof of protocol correctness
Demonstrated robustness in blockchain scenarios
Abstract
MEV attacks have been an omnipresent evil in the blockchain world, an implicit tax that uninformed users pay for using the service. The problem arises from the miners' ability to reorder and insert arbitrary transactions in the blocks they mine. This paper proposes a 2-phased transaction protocol to eliminate MEV attacks. The user requests an interaction token from the on-chain counter-party. This token serves as a blind preemption for the counter-party and prevents the reordering of transactions at lower levels in the blockchain framework. We prove the correctness of the CoMMA protocol and demonstrate its efficacy against MEV attacks.
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Cryptography and Data Security · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
