Efficient Communication in Organizations
Federico Vaccari

TL;DR
This paper identifies a simple, robust communication protocol that efficiently resolves information asymmetries in organizations, enhancing decision-making and reducing wasteful influence activities.
Contribution
It introduces a unique, efficient communication protocol with a closed-form characterization, robust to collusion and free from unnecessary complexities.
Findings
Only one protocol is efficient and robust
The protocol always induces efficient equilibria
A closed-form characterization of equilibria is provided
Abstract
This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by clearing information asymmetries without incurring costs. Results show that only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and public structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations that seek to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
