Auction-based Operation in LEO Satellite Systems for High-Efficiency Communications
Lin Cheng, Bernardo A. Huberman

TL;DR
This paper introduces an auction-based mechanism for LEO satellite systems that enhances communication efficiency by enabling ground stations to bid for resources, reducing overhead, and improving scalability and capacity.
Contribution
It presents a novel auction-based operation mechanism that improves resource allocation, reduces overhead, and enhances scalability in LEO satellite communication systems.
Findings
Increases total channel capacity through dynamic resource allocation.
Reduces uplink overhead with lightweight feedback.
Simplifies computational complexity and enhances scalability.
Abstract
We propose an auction-based mechanism to improve the efficiency of low earth orbit satellite communication systems. The mechanism allows the ground stations to bid for downlink resources such as spectrum, satellite links, or radios, without the need to send channel status back to satellites. Simulation and experimental results show that this mechanism improves total channel capacity by dynamically leveraging the diversity among satellite-station links; reduces uplink overhead by providing lightweight and effective channel status feedback; simplifies computational complexity and improves scalability; and also provides implicit resource information stemming from the auction dynamics. This new operation mechanism provides a feasible solution for low earth orbit satellites which are sensitive to power consumption and overheating.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsSatellite Communication Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · ICT Impact and Policies
