Haven't I Seen You Before? Assessing Identity Leakage in Synthetic Irises
Patrick Tinsley, Adam Czajka, Patrick Flynn

TL;DR
This paper investigates how GAN-generated iris images can unintentionally reveal training data identities, analyzing the leakage risk over training time and across different iris matchers.
Contribution
It provides a detailed analysis of identity leakage in synthetic iris images generated by StyleGAN3, highlighting when and how personal biometric data may leak during training.
Findings
Most synthetic iris samples do not leak identities
Some generated samples nearly perfectly match training data
Leakage risk varies with GAN training progress
Abstract
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have proven to be a preferred method of synthesizing fake images of objects, such as faces, animals, and automobiles. It is not surprising these models can also generate ISO-compliant, yet synthetic iris images, which can be used to augment training data for iris matchers and liveness detectors. In this work, we trained one of the most recent GAN models (StyleGAN3) to generate fake iris images with two primary goals: (i) to understand the GAN's ability to produce "never-before-seen" irises, and (ii) to investigate the phenomenon of identity leakage as a function of the GAN's training time. Previous work has shown that personal biometric data can inadvertently flow from training data into synthetic samples, raising a privacy concern for subjects who accidentally appear in the training dataset. This paper presents analysis for three different iris…
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Taxonomy
TopicsDigital Media Forensic Detection · Biometric Identification and Security · Generative Adversarial Networks and Image Synthesis
