Prophet Inequality: Order selection beats random order
Archit Bubna, Ashish Chiplunkar

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that allowing the gambler to choose the order of item arrivals in the prophet inequality problem results in a strictly better competitive ratio than random order, advancing the understanding of optimal strategies.
Contribution
The authors improve the competitive ratio for the order selection setting and establish a separation from the random order setting, providing new algorithms and hardness results.
Findings
A new 0.7258-competitive algorithm for order selection.
Improved hardness result of 0.7254 for the random order setting.
Evidence of a separation between order selection and random order scenarios.
Abstract
In the prophet inequality problem, a gambler faces a sequence of items arriving online with values drawn independently from known distributions. On seeing an item, the gambler must choose whether to accept its value as her reward and quit the game, or reject it and continue. The gambler's aim is to maximize her expected reward relative to the expected maximum of the values of all items. Since the seventies, a tight bound of 1/2 has been known for this competitive ratio in the setting where the items arrive in an adversarial order (Krengel and Sucheston, 1977, 1978). However, the optimum ratio still remains unknown in the order selection setting, where the gambler selects the arrival order, as well as in prophet secretary, where the items arrive in a random order. Moreover, it is not even known whether a separation exists between the two settings. In this paper, we show that the power…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
