Spontaneous emergence of groups and signaling diversity in dynamic networks
Zachary Fulker, Patrick Forber, Rory Smead, Christoph Riedl

TL;DR
This paper investigates how dynamic networks and signaling behaviors coevolve, leading to the spontaneous formation of diverse signaling groups, including hybrid strategies, which enhance information diversity and processing in populations.
Contribution
It demonstrates that signaling interactions in dynamic networks can spontaneously generate diverse and hybrid signaling groups, promoting stable signaling diversity and efficient information dissemination.
Findings
Signaling interactions cause endogenous formation of distinct groups.
Hybrid signaling groups emerge, combining different strategies.
Hybrid groups facilitate faster initial information diffusion.
Abstract
We study the coevolution of network structure and signaling behavior. We model agents who can preferentially associate with others in a dynamic network while they also learn to play a simple sender-receiver game. We have four major findings. First, signaling interactions in dynamic networks are sufficient to cause the endogenous formation of distinct signaling groups, even in an initially homogeneous population. Second, dynamic networks allow the emergence of novel {\em hybrid} signaling groups that do not converge on a single common signaling system but are instead composed of different yet complementary signaling strategies. We show that the presence of these hybrid groups promotes stable diversity in signaling among other groups in the population. Third, we find important distinctions in information processing capacity of different groups: hybrid groups diffuse information more…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Applications · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
