Whence deep realism for Everettian quantum mechanics?

TL;DR

This paper explores the philosophical debate on scientific realism in Everettian quantum mechanics, questioning whether deep metaphysical commitments are necessary for realism or if shallow realism suffices.

Contribution

It applies the distinction between shallow and deep realism to Everettian quantum mechanics, analyzing the debate on the existence of worlds and proposing a dilemma for realists.

Findings

Deep realist demands may be unfulfillable due to metaphysical limitations.

Realism can be justified without deep metaphysical commitments.

The debate highlights a dilemma between metaphysical feasibility and the necessity of realism.

Abstract

`Shallow' and `deep' versions of scientific realism may be distinguished as follows: the shallow realist is satisfied with belief in the existence of the posits of our best scientific theories; by contrast, deep realists claim that realism can be legitimate only if such entities are described in metaphysical terms. We argue that this methodological discussion can be fruitfully applied in Everettian quantum mechanics, specifically on the debate concerning the existence of worlds and the recent dispute between Everettian actualism and quantum modal realism. After presenting what is involved in such dispute, we point to a dilemma for realists: either we don't have the available metaphysical tools to answer the deep realist's demands, and realism is not justified in this case, or such demands of metaphysical dressing are not mandatory for scientific realism, and deep versions of realism are not really required.