Dynamical cooperation model for mitigating the segregation phase in Schelling's model

TL;DR

This paper introduces a dynamic cooperation model in Schelling's segregation framework, using a varying cooperation degree to prevent low-utility segregation states and promote homogenized, high-utility configurations.

Contribution

It proposes a novel dynamic cooperation mechanism that adjusts agents' cooperation based on their utility, effectively reducing segregation in the model.

Findings

High-utility homogenized states are achieved with dynamic cooperation.

The model suggests tax interventions can mitigate segregation.

Dynamic cooperation outperforms static approaches.

Abstract

We consider a Schelling-like segregation model, in which the behavior of individual agents is determined by a mixed individual and global utility. With a high ratio of global utility being incorporated, the agents are cooperative in order to realize a homogenized state, otherwise the agents are less cooperative, leading to an undesired Nash equilibrium with low utility. In the present study, we introduce a dynamically varying cooperation degree parameter to prevent the agents from falling into such a low-utility equilibrium state. More precisely, a large cooperation degree is assigned when the agents are in high-utility regions, whereas agents having low utility behave more individually. Simulation results show that homogenized phases with globally high utility are achieved with the present dynamical control, even for the case of a low mean value of cooperation degree. Since the cooperation degree represents the magnitude with which Pigouvian tax is enforced in the model of residential movement within a city, this result suggests the possibility of tax intervention to circumvent the undesired segregation of residents.