Exploring the stability of solar geoengineering agreements

TL;DR

This paper introduces a simple model to analyze how international cooperation on solar geoengineering is influenced by perceived risks, showing that higher risk perceptions decrease agreement stability regardless of countries' preferences.

Contribution

It provides a novel, straightforward model to study the impact of risk perception on the stability of international solar geoengineering agreements.

Findings

Cooperation is highly incentivized among nations.

Higher perceived risks reduce agreement stability.

Agreement stability is unaffected by countries' preferences.

Abstract

A simple model is introduced to study the cooperative behavior of nations regarding solar geoengineering. The results of this model are explored through numerical methods. A general finding is that cooperation and coordination between nations on solar geoengineering is very much incentivized. Furthermore, the stability of solar geoengineering agreements between nations crucially depends on the perceived riskiness of solar geoengineering. If solar geoengineering is perceived as riskier, the stability of the most stable solar geoengineering agreements is reduced. However, the stability of agreements is completely independent of countries preferences.