Evolutionary dynamics in repeated optional games
Fang Chen, Lei Zhou, Long Wang

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that voluntary participation in repeated games significantly enhances cooperation, identifying new strategies that leverage opt-out options to sustain cooperative behavior even in challenging conditions.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive analysis of repeated optional games, revealing how voluntary participation promotes cooperation and characterizing novel error-robust strategies supporting cooperation.
Findings
Voluntary participation greatly increases cooperation rates.
Three new classes of strategies are identified as effective and robust.
Opt-out options help avoid mutual defection and deter defectors.
Abstract
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human societies. Here, we consider repeated optional games, where individuals can freely opt out of each interaction and rejoin later. We find that voluntary participation greatly promotes cooperation in repeated interactions, even in harsh situations where repeated compulsory games and one-shot optional games yield low cooperation rates. Moreover, we theoretically characterize all Nash equilibria that support cooperation among reactive strategies, and identify three novel classes of strategies that are error-robust, readily become equilibria, and dominate in the evolutionary dynamics. The success of these strategies hinges on the effect of opt-out: it not only…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
