The Simplicity of Physical Laws
Eddy Keming Chen

TL;DR
This paper argues that simplicity should be regarded as a fundamental epistemic guide in discovering physical laws, challenging traditional views and showing its connection to lawhood rather than mere truth.
Contribution
It proposes a new perspective for nomic realists to prioritize simplicity in law discovery, dissolving the supposed epistemic advantage of Humeanism over non-Humeanism.
Findings
Simplicity is a key epistemic guide for law discovery.
The advantage of Humeanism over non-Humeanism is undermined.
Simplicity relates more to lawhood than to truth.
Abstract
Physical laws are strikingly simple, yet there is no a priori reason for them to be so. I propose that nomic realists -- Humeans and non-Humeans -- should recognize simplicity as a fundamental epistemic guide for discovering and evaluating candidate physical laws. This proposal helps resolve several longstanding problems of nomic realism and simplicity. A key consequence is that the presumed epistemic advantage of Humeanism over non-Humeanism dissolves, undermining a prominent epistemological argument for Humeanism. Moreover, simplicity is shown to be more connected to lawhood than to mere truth.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
