Better Approximation for Interdependent SOS Valuations
Pinyan Lu, Enze Sun, Chenghan Zhou

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new truthful mechanism for interdependent SOS valuations that improves the approximation ratio from 4 to 3.315, advancing the design of efficient auctions in complex valuation settings.
Contribution
It presents a novel, simple truthful mechanism achieving a better approximation ratio for interdependent SOS valuations, narrowing the gap to the lower bound.
Findings
Achieves a 3.315-approximation ratio
Improves upon the previous 4-approximation mechanism
Provides insights into truthful auction design for interdependent valuations
Abstract
Submodular over signal (SOS) defines a family of interesting functions for which there exist truthful mechanisms with constant approximation to the social welfare for agents with interdependent valuations. The best-known truthful auction is of -approximation and a lower bound of 2 was proved. We propose a new and simple truthful mechanism to achieve an approximation ratio of 3.315.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Housing Market and Economics · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
