Dynamics of a linearly-perturbed May-Leonard competition model
Gabriela Jaramillo, Lidia Mrad, Tracy L. Stepien

TL;DR
This paper investigates how small linear mutations in the May-Leonard competition model alter its dynamics, revealing new bifurcation behaviors and stable states while disrupting some original heteroclinic connections.
Contribution
It introduces a linear mutation perturbation to the May-Leonard model and analyzes its impact on the system's dynamics, uncovering new bifurcations and stable equilibria.
Findings
Retains some classical dynamics at small mutation rates
Identifies fold bifurcations with emerging and coalescing equilibria
Discovers new stable fixed points absent in the original model
Abstract
The May--Leonard model was introduced to examine the behavior of three competing populations where rich dynamics, such as limit cycles and nonperiodic cyclic solutions, arise. In this work, we perturb the system by adding the capability of global mutations, allowing one species to evolve to the other two in a linear manner. We find that for small mutation rates the perturbed system not only retains some of the dynamics seen in the classical model, such as the three-species equal-population equilibrium bifurcating to a limit cycle, but also exhibits new behavior. For instance, we capture curves of fold bifurcations where pairs of equilibria emerge and then coalesce. As a result, we uncover parameter regimes with new types of stable fixed points that are distinct from the single- and dual-population equilibria characteristic of the original model. On the contrary, the linearly-perturbed…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
