Game Theoretic Rating in N-player general-sum games with Equilibria
Luke Marris, Marc Lanctot, Ian Gemp, Shayegan Omidshafiei, Stephen, McAleer, Jerome Connor, Karl Tuyls, Thore Graepel

TL;DR
This paper introduces new algorithms for rating strategies in N-player, general-sum games using game theoretic solutions, enabling more accurate evaluation of strategies in complex multiagent interactions.
Contribution
It generalizes existing rating methods to N-player, general-sum games and proposes algorithms that leverage equilibria for strategy evaluation.
Findings
Validated on real-world data (Premier League)
Effective in multiagent reinforcement learning scenarios
Improves strategy rating accuracy in complex games
Abstract
Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Traditionally, only transitive dependencies between strategies have been used to rate strategies (e.g. Elo), however recent work has expanded ratings to utilize game theoretic solutions to better rate strategies in non-transitive games. This work generalizes these ideas and proposes novel algorithms suitable for N-player, general-sum rating of strategies in normal-form games according to the payoff rating system. This enables well-established solution concepts, such as equilibria, to be leveraged to efficiently rate strategies in games with complex strategic interactions, which arise in multiagent training and real-world interactions between many agents. We empirically validate our methods on real world…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSports Analytics and Performance · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Artificial Intelligence in Games
