GANTouch: An Attack-Resilient Framework for Touch-based Continuous Authentication System

TL;DR

This paper introduces GANTouch, a GAN-assisted touch-based authentication framework that demonstrates improved resilience against active adversarial attacks compared to traditional methods, highlighting the importance of adversarial testing.

Contribution

The study proposes a novel GAN-assisted TCAS framework and evaluates its robustness against various active adversarial environments, showing enhanced security over existing systems.

Findings

GANTouch is more resilient than V-TCAS under adversarial attacks.

FAR increases are lower for GANTouch in attack scenarios.

TCAS is fair across different genders.

Abstract

Previous studies have shown that commonly studied (vanilla) implementations of touch-based continuous authentication systems (V-TCAS) are susceptible to active adversarial attempts. This study presents a novel Generative Adversarial Network assisted TCAS (G-TCAS) framework and compares it to the V-TCAS under three active adversarial environments viz. Zero-effort, Population, and Random-vector. The Zero-effort environment was implemented in two variations viz. Zero-effort (same-dataset) and Zero-effort (cross-dataset). The first involved a Zero-effort attack from the same dataset, while the second used three different datasets. G-TCAS showed more resilience than V-TCAS under the Population and Random-vector, the more damaging adversarial scenarios than the Zero-effort. On average, the increase in the false accept rates (FARs) for V-TCAS was much higher (27.5% and 21.5%) than for G-TCAS (14% and 12.5%) for Population and Random-vector attacks, respectively. Moreover, we performed a fairness analysis of TCAS for different genders and found TCAS to be fair across genders. The findings suggest that we should evaluate TCAS under active adversarial environments and affirm the usefulness of GANs in the TCAS pipeline.