Strategic Communication via Cascade Multiple Description Network
Rony Bou Rouphael, Ma\"el Le trust

TL;DR
This paper explores the fundamental limits of strategic communication in a three-node cascade network, extending Bayesian persuasion concepts with an information-theoretic approach to optimize strategies and minimize long-term costs.
Contribution
It introduces an information-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic communication in cascade networks, extending Bayesian persuasion to a three-node setting with sequential decision-making.
Findings
Characterization of optimal strategies for encoder, relay, and decoder.
Asymptotic analysis of the encoder’s minimal long-run cost.
Extension of Bayesian persuasion to cascade network scenarios.
Abstract
In decentralized decision-making problems, agents choose their actions based on locally available information and knowledge about decision rules or strategies of other agents. We consider a three-node cascade network with an encoder, a relay and a decoder, having distinct objectives captured by cost functions. In such a cascade network, agents choose their respective strategies sequentially, as a response to the former agent's strategy and in a way to influence the decision of the latter agent in the network. We assume the encoder commits to a strategy before the communication takes place. Upon revelation of the encoding strategy, the relay commits to a strategy and reveals it. The communication starts, the source sequence is drawn and processed by the encoder and relay. Then, the decoder observes a sequences of symbols, updates its Bayesian posterior beliefs accordingly, and takes the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
