Broadening the Complexity-theoretic Analysis of Manipulative Attacks in Group Identification

TL;DR

This paper extends the complexity analysis of manipulative attacks in group identification, exploring new rules and problem variants to better understand what makes certain attacks computationally hard or easy.

Contribution

It introduces new social rules, analyzes the complexity of group control and bribery for these rules, and examines specific instances where individuals are initially socially qualified.

Findings

Complexity results for new iterative consensus rules.

Analysis of microbribery in protective instances.

Complexity classifications for relaxed control variants.

Abstract

In the Group Identification problem, we are given a set of individuals and are asked to identify a socially qualified subset among them. Each individual in the set has an opinion about who should be considered socially qualified. There are several different rules that can be used to determine the socially qualified subset based on these mutual opinions. In a manipulative attack, an outsider attempts to exploit the way the used rule works, with the goal of changing the outcome of the selection process to their liking. In recent years, the complexity of group control and bribery based manipulative attacks in Group Identification has been the subject of intense research. However, the picture is far from complete, and there remain many open questions related to what exactly makes certain problems hard, or certain rules immune to some attacks. Supplementing previous results, we examine the complexity of group microbribery on so-called protective problem instances; that is, instances where all individuals from the constructive target set are already socially qualified initially. In addition, we study a relaxed variant of group control by deleting individuals for the consent rules, the consensus-start-respecting rule, and the liberal-start-respecting rule. Based on existing literature, we also formalize three new social rules of the iterative consensus type, and we provide a comprehensive complexity-theoretic analysis of group control and bribery problems for these rules.