Chameleon Cache: Approximating Fully Associative Caches with Random Replacement to Prevent Contention-Based Cache Attacks
Thomas Unterluggauer, Austin Harris, Scott Constable, Fangfei Liu,, Carlos Rozas

TL;DR
Chameleon Cache enhances randomized cache defenses against side-channel attacks by adding a victim cache that decouples contention from evictions, maintaining security with minimal performance overhead.
Contribution
This paper introduces Chameleon Cache, a novel cache architecture that combines randomized set mapping with a victim cache to improve side-channel resistance and reduce re-keying frequency.
Findings
Achieves < 1% performance overhead
Effectively hides eviction patterns from attackers
Enhances side-channel resistance with minimal complexity
Abstract
Randomized, skewed caches (RSCs) such as CEASER-S have recently received much attention to defend against contention-based cache side channels. By randomizing and regularly changing the mapping(s) of addresses to cache sets, these techniques are designed to obfuscate the leakage of memory access patterns. However, new attack techniques, e.g., Prime+Prune+Probe, soon demonstrated the limits of RSCs as they allow attackers to more quickly learn which addresses contend in the cache and use this information to circumvent the randomization. To yet maintain side-channel resilience, RSCs must change the random mapping(s) more frequently with adverse effects on performance and implementation complexity. This work aims to make randomization-based approaches more robust to allow for reduced re-keying rates and presents Chameleon Cache. Chameleon Cache extends RSCs with a victim cache (VC) to…
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