Truth and Falsity in Buridan's Bridge
Paul \'Egr\'e

TL;DR
This paper analyzes Buridan's Bridge paradox, comparing four solutions, and discusses their implications for theories of truth, including classical logic and dialetheism, with insights from Cervantes and Jacquette.
Contribution
It provides a detailed comparison of four distinct solutions to Buridan's Bridge paradox and explores their compatibility with classical and dialetheist theories of truth.
Findings
Buridan's solution aligns with classical logic.
Cervantes's and Jacquette's views support dialetheism.
Jacquette's account endorses strict-tolerant truth.
Abstract
This paper revisits Buridan's Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 17), itself close kin to the Liar paradox, a version of which also appears in Bradwardine's Insolubilia. Prompted by the occurrence of the paradox in Cervantes's Don Quixote, I discuss and compare four distinct solutions to the problem, namely Bradwardine's "just false" conception, Buridan's "contingently true/false" theory, Cervantes's "both true and false" view, and then Jacquette's "neither true simpliciter nor false simpliciter" account. All have in common to accept that the Bridge expresses a truth-apt proposition, but only the latter three endorse the transparency of truth. Against some previous commentaries I first show that Buridan's solution is fully compliant with an account of the paradox within classical logic. I then show that Cervantes's insights, as well as Jacquette's treatment, are both…
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Taxonomy
TopicsClassical Philosophy and Thought · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
