Local political control in educational policy: Evidence from decentralized teacher pay reform under England's local education authorities
Yiang Li, Xingzuo Zhou

TL;DR
This study investigates how local political control influences educational pay policies in England, showing Conservative-controlled authorities favor flexible, market-oriented pay structures over traditional seniority-based systems.
Contribution
It provides empirical evidence that local political party control significantly affects educational policy decisions in England's decentralized system.
Findings
Conservative-controlled LEAs prefer flexible pay structures.
Political control influences local educational policy choices.
Results are robust across different model specifications.
Abstract
In 2012, the School Teachers' Review Body discontinued central guidance and allowed school discretion in determining teachers' pay in England. Meanwhile, local education authorities (LEAs) offer non-statutory teacher pay recommendations to LEA-controlled schools. This study examines how LEAs' political party control determines their guidance regarding whether to adopt flexible performance pay or continue seniority-based pay. A regression discontinuity design is used to address the endogeneity of political control and educational policy-making. We find that marginally Conservative-controlled LEAs are more inclined to recommend market-oriented flexible pay structures. The results remain robust to alternative specifications. This study reveals that politics matter in England's local educational policy-making, which has broad implications for future policy.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSchool Choice and Performance
