Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis of Digital Human-System Interface Relevant to Reactor Trip
Edward Chen, Han Bao, Tate Shorthill, Hongbin Zhang, Nam Dinh

TL;DR
This paper presents a systems-theoretic hazard analysis method to identify vulnerabilities in digital human-system interfaces for nuclear reactors, enhancing safety and reliability assessments.
Contribution
It introduces a novel redundancy-guided hazard analysis approach tailored for digital HSI systems in nuclear power plants.
Findings
Identified key vulnerabilities in HSI design.
Demonstrated the effectiveness of the hazard analysis method.
Supported licensing and deployment of digital I&C systems.
Abstract
Human-system interface is one of the key advanced design features applied to modern digital instrumentation and control systems of nuclear power plants. The conventional design is based on a compact workstation-based system within the control room. The compact workstation provides both a strategic operating environment while also a convenient display for plant status information necessary to the operator. The control environment is further enhanced through display panels, visual and auditory alarms, and procedure systems. However, just like the legacy control, the HSI should incorporate diversity to demonstrate sufficient defense-in-depth protection against common cause failures of the safety system. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the HSI is affected by a plethora of factors, such as human error, cyberattacks, software common cause failures, etc., that complicate the design and…
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Taxonomy
TopicsRisk and Safety Analysis · Occupational Health and Safety Research · Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
