Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions

TL;DR

This paper introduces a strategyproof scheduling mechanism that effectively balances leveraging machine-learned predictions with worst-case guarantees, achieving near-optimal performance when predictions are accurate and maintaining robustness otherwise.

Contribution

It presents the first deterministic strategyproof mechanism with combined consistency and robustness guarantees in learning-augmented scheduling.

Findings

Achieves 6- consistency and 2n- robustness in scheduling.

Provides bounds based on prediction error.

Shows unbounded robustness for 1- consistent mechanisms.

Abstract

In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, \citet{NR99} studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrelated machines aiming to minimize the makespan. They provided a strategyproof mechanism that achieves an $n$-approximation and they made the bold conjecture that this is the best approximation achievable by any deterministic strategyproof scheduling mechanism. After more than two decades and several efforts, $n$ remains the best known approximation and very recent work by \citet{CKK21} has been able to prove an $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ approximation lower bound for all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. This strong negative result, however, heavily depends on the fact that the performance of these mechanisms is evaluated using worst-case analysis. To overcome such overly pessimistic, and often uninformative, worst-case bounds, a surge of recent work has focused on the ``learning-augmented framework'', whose goal is to leverage machine-learned predictions to obtain improved approximations when these predictions are accurate (consistency), while also achieving near-optimal worst-case approximations even when the predictions are arbitrarily wrong (robustness). In this work, we study the classic strategic scheduling problem of~\citet{NR99} using the learning-augmented framework and give a deterministic polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism that is $6$-consistent and $2n$-robust. We thus achieve the ``best of both worlds'': an $O(1)$ consistency and an $O(n)$ robustness that asymptotically matches the best-known approximation. We then extend this result to provide more general worst-case approximation guarantees as a function of the prediction error. Finally, we complement our positive results by showing that any $1$-consistent deterministic strategyproof mechanism has unbounded robustness.