Evaluating the Security of Aircraft Systems

TL;DR

This paper reviews aircraft systems' cybersecurity, analyzing threats, attack techniques, and risks, and proposes a taxonomy based on adversary tactics and the MITRE ATT&CK framework to enhance understanding and defense strategies.

Contribution

It introduces a comprehensive taxonomy of cyber threats to aircraft systems, categorizing attack techniques and mapping them to established frameworks for improved security analysis.

Findings

Identification of key cyber threats to aircraft systems

Mapping attack techniques to MITRE ATT&CK framework

Categorization of threats using STRIDE model

Abstract

The sophistication and complexity of cyber attacks and the variety of targeted platforms have been growing in recent years. Various adversaries are abusing an increasing range of platforms, e.g., enterprise platforms, mobile phones, PCs, transportation systems, and industrial control systems. In recent years, we have witnessed various cyber attacks on transportation systems, including attacks on ports, airports, and trains. It is only a matter of time before transportation systems become a more common target of cyber attackers. Due to the enormous potential damage inherent in attacking vehicles carrying many passengers and the lack of security measures applied in traditional airborne systems, the vulnerability of aircraft systems is one of the most concerning topics in the vehicle security domain. This paper provides a comprehensive review of aircraft systems and components and their various networks, emphasizing the cyber threats they are exposed to and the impact of a cyber attack on these components and networks and the essential capabilities of the aircraft. In addition, we present a comprehensive and in-depth taxonomy that standardizes the knowledge and understanding of cyber security in the avionics field from an adversary's perspective. The taxonomy divides techniques into relevant categories (tactics) reflecting the various phases of the adversarial attack lifecycle and maps existing attacks according to the MITRE ATT&CK methodology. Furthermore, we analyze the security risks among the various systems according to the potential threat actors and categorize the threats based on STRIDE threat model. Future work directions are presented as guidelines for industry and academia.