Personal Identity and Uncertainty in the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

TL;DR

This paper examines the incoherence problem of the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and argues that resolving it via pre-measurement uncertainty conflicts with physicalist principles.

Contribution

It critically analyzes the pre-measurement uncertainty approach and demonstrates its incompatibility with physicalism across different ontological views of EQM.

Findings

Pre-measurement uncertainty cannot resolve the incoherence problem without contradicting physicalism.

The analysis applies to both 3D and 4D views of personhood.

Divergence view of EQM exemplifies the broader argument.

Abstract

The deterministic nature of EQM (the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics) seems to be inconsistent to the use of probability in EQM, giving rise to what is known as the "incoherence problem". In this paper, I explore approaches to solve the incoherence problem of EQM via pre-measurement uncertainty. Previous discussions on the validity of pre-measurement uncertainty have leaned heavily on intricate aspects of the theory of semantics and reference, the embrace of either 4-dimensionalism or 3-dimensionalism of personhood, or the ontology of EQM. In this paper, I argue that, regardless of the adoption of whether 3-dimensionalism or 4-dimensionalism of personhood, the overlapping view or the divergence view of the ontology of EQM, the pre-measurement uncertainty approach to the incoherence problem of EQM can only archive success while contradicting fundamental principles of physicalism. I also use the divergence view of EQM as an example to illustrate my analyses.