A repeated unknown game: Decentralized task offloading in vehicular fog computing

TL;DR

This paper introduces a decentralized learning approach for vehicular fog computing where agents independently learn to offload tasks efficiently amid uncertain and dynamic costs, improving overall system performance.

Contribution

It extends uncoupled learning algorithms to multi-agent vehicular fog offloading, enabling decentralized decision-making under unknown, volatile conditions.

Findings

Agents adapt to cost fluctuations and congestion.

The approach converges to near-optimal social welfare.

Reduces overall offloading costs in simulations.

Abstract

Offloading computation to nearby edge/fog computing nodes, including the ones carried by moving vehicles, e.g., vehicular fog nodes (VFN), has proved to be a promising approach for enabling low-latency and compute-intensive mobility applications, such as cooperative and autonomous driving. This work considers vehicular fog computing scenarios where the clients of computation offloading services try to minimize their own costs while deciding which VFNs to offload their tasks. We focus on decentralized multi-agent decision-making in a repeated unknown game where each agent, e.g., service client, can observe only its own action and realized cost. In other words, each agent is unaware of the game composition or even the existence of opponents. We apply a completely uncoupled learning rule to generalize the decentralized decision-making algorithm presented in \cite{Cho2021} for the multi-agent case. The multi-agent solution proposed in this work can capture the unknown offloading cost variations susceptive to resource congestion under an adversarial framework where each agent may take implicit cost estimation and suitable resource choice adapting to the dynamics associated with volatile supply and demand. According to the evaluation via simulation, this work reveals that such individual perturbations for robustness to uncertainty and adaptation to dynamicity ensure a certain level of optimality in terms of social welfare, e.g., converging the actual sequence of play with unknown and asymmetric attributes and lowering the correspondent cost in social welfare due to the self-interested behaviors of agents.