Passive Triangulation Attack on ORide
Shyam Murthy, Srinivas Vivek

TL;DR
This paper presents a passive triangulation attack on the ORide ride-hailing privacy protocol, demonstrating the ability to locate drivers even with noisy distance data, thus exposing privacy vulnerabilities.
Contribution
The authors extend previous triangulation attacks to work with noisy Euclidean distances, revealing privacy breaches in the ORide protocol even when countermeasures are applied.
Findings
Attack can locate all drivers without noise.
With noise, about 25-50% of drivers' locations are revealed.
Algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Abstract
Privacy preservation in Ride Hailing Services is intended to protect privacy of drivers and riders. ORide is one of the early RHS proposals published at USENIX Security Symposium 2017. In the ORide protocol, riders and drivers, operating in a zone, encrypt their locations using a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption scheme (SHE) and forward them to the Service Provider (SP). SP homomorphically computes the squared Euclidean distance between riders and available drivers. Rider receives the encrypted distances and selects the optimal rider after decryption. In order to prevent a triangulation attack, SP randomly permutes the distances before sending them to the rider. In this work, we use propose a passive attack that uses triangulation to determine coordinates of all participating drivers whose permuted distances are available from the points of view of multiple honest-but-curious adversary…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Biometric Identification and Security · Cryptography and Data Security
