How (and Why) to Think that the Brain is Literally a Computer

TL;DR

This paper argues that the brain can be genuinely understood as a computational system by establishing empirical criteria for computation, demonstrating how the brain fits these criteria, and clarifying the implications of this perspective.

Contribution

It introduces empirical criteria for what makes a physical system genuinely computational and applies these to the brain, supporting the view that the brain is a real computer.

Findings

Empirical criteria distinguish genuine computational systems from mere metaphor.

The brain likely functions as an analog computer based on these criteria.

Viewing the brain as a computer is both informative and falsifiable.

Abstract

The relationship between brains and computers is often taken to be merely metaphorical. However, genuine computational systems can be implemented in virtually any media; thus, one can take seriously the view that brains literally compute. But without empirical criteria for what makes a physical system genuinely a computational one, computation remains a matter of perspective, especially for natural systems (e.g., brains) that were not explicitly designed and engineered to be computers. Considerations from real examples of physical computers-both analog and digital, contemporary and historical-make clear what those empirical criteria must be. Finally, applying those criteria to the brain shows how we can view the brain as a computer (probably an analog one at that), which, in turn, illuminates how that claim is both informative and falsifiable.