Absorbing Blackwell Games
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, J\'anos Flesch, Eilon Solan

TL;DR
This paper presents a simplified proof for the existence of approximate equilibria in two-player absorbing stochastic games with tail-measurable payoffs, building on recent mathematical tools and classical methods.
Contribution
It offers a more straightforward proof for $ extepsilon$-equilibria in two-player absorbing games with tail-measurable payoffs, enhancing understanding and accessibility.
Findings
Simplified proof for $ extepsilon$-equilibrium existence
Applicable to two-player absorbing games with tail-measurable payoffs
Combines recent mathematical tools with classical methods
Abstract
It was shown in Flesch and Solan (2022) with a rather involved proof that all two-player stochastic games with finite state and action spaces and shift-invariant payoffs admit an -equilibrium, for every . Their proof also holds for two-player absorbing games with tail-measurable payoffs. In this paper we provide a simpler proof for the existence of -equilibrium in two-player absorbing games with tail-measurable payoffs, by combining recent mathematical tools for such payoff functions with classical tools for absorbing games.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications
