Fair Division meets Vehicle Routing: Fairness for Drivers with Monotone Profits

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel model combining fair division and vehicle routing with drivers' monotone profit preferences, proposing new fairness notions and algorithms to ensure equitable and envy-free driver allocations.

Contribution

It develops new fairness concepts (FEQ1 and FEF1) for drivers in vehicle routing, along with algorithms to guarantee these fairness criteria.

Findings

FEQ1 and FEF1 are effective fairness notions for drivers.

Algorithms are provided to achieve FEQ1 and FEF1 guarantees.

Comparison shows these notions relate well to existing fair division concepts.

Abstract

We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests. For this model, we design two new axiomatic notions for fairness for drivers: FEQ1 and FEF1. FEQ1 encodes driver pairwise bounded equitability. FEF1 encodes driver pairwise bounded envy freeness. We compare FEQ1 and FEF1 with popular fair division notions such as EQ1 and EF1. We also give algorithms for guaranteeing FEQ1 and FEF1, respectively.