On the map-territory fallacy fallacy

TL;DR

This paper defends the free energy principle (FEP) against criticisms based on the map-territory fallacy, clarifying its scope and demonstrating its consistency as a universal model in statistical physics.

Contribution

It introduces a meta-theoretical perspective that refutes the fallacy used to criticize the FEP, emphasizing its unique status as a comprehensive model of physical systems.

Findings

FEP is a consistent, physics-inspired theory of inferences.

The map-territory fallacy fallacy invalidates criticisms of the FEP.

FEP is uniquely suited as a formal model of generic systems.

Abstract

This paper presents a meta-theory of the usage of the free energy principle (FEP) and examines its scope in the modelling of physical systems. We consider the so-called `map-territory fallacy' and the fallacious reification of model properties. By showing that the FEP is a consistent, physics-inspired theory of inferences of inferences, we disprove the assertion that the map-territory fallacy contradicts the principled usage of the FEP. As such, we argue that deploying the map-territory fallacy to criticise the use of the FEP and Bayesian mechanics itself constitutes a fallacy: what we call the {\it map-territory fallacy fallacy}. In so doing, we emphasise a few key points: the uniqueness of the FEP as a model of particles or agents that model their environments; the restoration of convention to the FEP via its relation to the principle of constrained maximum entropy; the `Jaynes optimality' of the FEP under this relation; and finally, the way that this meta-theoretical approach to the FEP clarifies its utility and scope as a formal modelling tool. Taken together, these features make the FEP, uniquely, {\it the} ideal model of generic systems in statistical physics.