Shielding Federated Learning Systems against Inference Attacks with ARM TrustZone
Aghiles Ait Messaoud, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, Vlad Nitu, Valerio, Schiavoni

TL;DR
This paper introduces GradSec, a method that enhances federated learning privacy by protecting only sensitive model layers within ARM TrustZone TEEs, reducing TCB size and training time while defending against inference attacks.
Contribution
GradSec is a novel approach that selectively protects sensitive model layers in TEEs, improving efficiency and security over existing methods like DarkneTZ.
Findings
Reduces TCB size by up to 30%
Decreases training time by up to 56%
Effectively defends against inference attacks
Abstract
Federated Learning (FL) opens new perspectives for training machine learning models while keeping personal data on the users premises. Specifically, in FL, models are trained on the users devices and only model updates (i.e., gradients) are sent to a central server for aggregation purposes. However, the long list of inference attacks that leak private data from gradients, published in the recent years, have emphasized the need of devising effective protection mechanisms to incentivize the adoption of FL at scale. While there exist solutions to mitigate these attacks on the server side, little has been done to protect users from attacks performed on the client side. In this context, the use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) on the client side are among the most proposing solutions. However, existing frameworks (e.g., DarkneTZ) require statically putting a large portion of the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
