Academic Co-authorship is a Risky Game
Teddy Lazebnik, Stephan Beck, Labib Shami

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theory-based computational model to analyze co-authorship dynamics, revealing that current academic practices are risky and often rely on researcher integrity rather than systematic design.
Contribution
It presents the first data-driven, game-theory model for co-authorship, highlighting how ultimatums and relationships influence authorship outcomes and publication processes.
Findings
Ultimatums significantly affect co-author order and publication length.
Current practices are risky and depend on researcher integrity.
Model reveals systemic issues in academic collaboration dynamics.
Abstract
Conducting a research project with multiple participants is a complex task that involves not only scientific but also multiple social, political, and psychological interactions. This complexity becomes particularly evident when it comes to navigating the selection process for the number and order of co-authors on the resulting manuscript for publication due to the current form of collaboration dynamics common in academia. There is currently no computational model to generate a data-driven suggestion that could be used as a baseline for understating these dynamics. To address this limitation, we have developed a first game-theory-based model to generate such a baseline for co-authorship. In our model, co-authors can issued an ultimatum to pause the publication of the manuscript until the underlying issue has been resolved. We modeled the effect of issuing one or more ultimatums and…
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Taxonomy
Topicsscientometrics and bibliometrics research · Complex Network Analysis Techniques
