Time-constrained Dynamic Mechanisms for College Admissions

TL;DR

This paper investigates how time constraints in dynamic college admission mechanisms can negatively impact outcomes, showing both theoretical and empirical evidence that they may lead to instability and worse results than traditional methods.

Contribution

It introduces the under-explored impact of time constraints on dynamic mechanisms, providing theoretical analysis and empirical evidence from Inner Mongolian university admissions.

Findings

Time constraints can worsen outcomes compared to deferred acceptance.

Time constraints may prevent dynamic mechanisms from achieving stability.

Empirical evidence shows winners and losers due to time constraints.

Abstract

Recent literature shows that dynamic matching mechanisms may outperform the standard mechanisms to deliver desirable results. We highlight an under-explored design dimension, the time constraints that students face under such a dynamic mechanism. First, we theoretically explore the effect of time constraints and show that the outcome can be worse than the outcome produced by the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Second, we present evidence from the Inner Mongolian university admissions that time constraints can prevent dynamic mechanisms from achieving stable outcomes, creating losers and winners among students.