Asymmetric cut and choose games
Peter Holy, Philipp Schlicht, Christopher Turner, Philip Welch
TL;DR
This paper explores asymmetric cut and choose games, linking them to large cardinals and properties of ideals and partial orders, revealing new characterizations of distributivity, strategic closure, and precipitousness.
Contribution
It introduces a novel framework connecting cut and choose games with large cardinals and ideal properties, providing new characterizations and insights.
Findings
Games characterize properties of ideals and partial orders
Connections established with large cardinal hypotheses
New characterizations of distributivity and precipitousness
Abstract
We investigate a variety of cut and choose games, their relationship with (generic) large cardinals, and show that they can be used to characterize a number of properties of ideals and of partial orders: certain notions of distributivity, strategic closure, and precipitousness.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Topology and Set Theory · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications