Wink: Deniable Secure Messaging
Anrin Chakraborti, Darius Suciu, Radu Sion

TL;DR
Wink introduces a plausible deniability system for end-to-end encrypted messaging, enabling hidden communication within existing apps by leveraging trusted execution environments, thus protecting message confidentiality even under device compromise.
Contribution
It presents the first plausible deniability messaging system that works with existing E2EE apps by embedding hidden messages in cryptographic elements using TEEs.
Findings
Successfully integrated with Telegram and Signal
Minimal overhead and no change to message formats
Provides strong plausible deniability even under device compromise
Abstract
End-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging is an essential first step in providing message confidentiality. Unfortunately, all security guarantees of end-to-end encryption are lost when keys or plaintext are disclosed, either due to device compromise or (sometimes lawful) coercion by powerful adversaries. This work introduces Wink, the first plausibly-deniable messaging system protecting message confidentiality from partial device compromise and compelled key disclosure. Wink can surreptitiously inject hidden messages in standard random coins (e.g., salts, IVs) used by existing E2EE protocols. It does so as part of legitimate secure cryptographic functionality deployed inside the widely-available trusted execution environment (TEE) TrustZone. This results in hidden communication using virtually unchanged existing E2EE messaging apps, as well as strong plausible deniability. Wink has been…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Cloud Data Security Solutions · User Authentication and Security Systems
