Assessing the impact of cyber attacks manipulating distributed energy resources on power system operation

TL;DR

This paper investigates how cyber attacks manipulating distributed energy resources (DERs) can disrupt power system operations, analyzing scenarios of disconnection and setpoint manipulation through simulations to identify mitigation strategies.

Contribution

It introduces detailed manipulation scenarios for DERs, assesses their impact on power systems, and proposes mitigation methods like tap changer operation and Q setpoint limitations.

Findings

DER Q setpoint manipulation can cause local cascading failures.

Mitigation strategies include automated tap changers and Q setpoint restrictions.

DER disconnection results in significant loss of active power injection.

Abstract

Successful cyber attacks on power systems cause severe disruptions. One possible manipulation strategy is the utilization of distributed energy resources (DERs) to disturb power system operation. In addition to the impact on bulk power system frequency, local cascading effects caused by DER control and protection can increase the severity of this strategy. To investigate these effects, manipulation scenarios including the disconnection as well as the manipulation of active (P) and reactive power (Q) setpoints of DERs are derived. The impact is analyzed using time-domain simulations and quantified using assessment criteria such as voltage band violation and plant protection triggering. Though DER disconnection leads to high amounts of lost P injection the manipulation of Q setpoints offers potential to disconnect additional DERs through local cascading effects. To mitigate the impact of the manipulation scenarios automated tap changer operation as well as a limitation of remotely accessible Q is suitable.