The Computational Complexity of Multi-player Concave Games and Kakutani Fixed Points
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis,, Manolis Zampetakis

TL;DR
This paper establishes the PPAD-completeness of a general computational formulation of Kakutani's Fixed Point theorem and applies it to determine the complexity of finding equilibria in concave games and Walrasian economies.
Contribution
It introduces a broad computational formulation of Kakutani's theorem and characterizes the complexity of equilibrium problems in economics and game theory.
Findings
Kakutani's Fixed Point problem is PPAD-complete.
Finding equilibria in concave games is PPAD-hard even with simple utilities.
Walrasian equilibrium with convex utilities is in PPAD.
Abstract
Kakutani's Fixed Point theorem is a fundamental theorem in topology with numerous applications in game theory and economics. Computational formulations of Kakutani exist only in special cases and are too restrictive to be useful in reductions. In this paper, we provide a general computational formulation of Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem and we prove that it is PPAD-complete. As an application of our theorem we are able to characterize the computational complexity of the following fundamental problems: (1) Concave Games. Introduced by the celebrated works of Debreu and Rosen in the 1950s and 60s, concave -person games have found many important applications in Economics and Game Theory. We characterize the computational complexity of finding an equilibrium in such games. We show that a general formulation of this problem belongs to PPAD, and that finding an equilibrium is PPAD-hard…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications
