Interactive Recommendations for Optimal Allocations in Markets with Constraints
Yigit Efe Erginbas, Soham Phade, Kannan Ramchandran

TL;DR
This paper introduces an interactive recommendation framework that optimally allocates limited items to users under capacity constraints by combining bandit algorithms, collaborative filtering, and pricing strategies, with proven regret bounds and empirical validation.
Contribution
It presents a novel low-rank combinatorial bandit model for constrained recommendations, integrating multiple techniques to improve allocation quality and provide theoretical guarantees.
Findings
Achieves sub-linear regret of rac{1}{2} rac{N M (N+M) R T}{
Demonstrates effectiveness on synthetic data
Validates performance on real-world datasets
Abstract
Recommendation systems when employed in markets play a dual role: they assist users in selecting their most desired items from a large pool and they help in allocating a limited number of items to the users who desire them the most. Despite the prevalence of capacity constraints on allocations in many real-world recommendation settings, a principled way of incorporating them in the design of these systems has been lacking. Motivated by this, we propose an interactive framework where the system provider can enhance the quality of recommendations to the users by opportunistically exploring allocations that maximize user rewards and respect the capacity constraints using appropriate pricing mechanisms. We model the problem as an instance of a low-rank combinatorial multi-armed bandit problem with selection constraints on the arms. We employ an integrated approach using techniques from…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Smart Grid Energy Management · Auction Theory and Applications
