Temporal patterns of reciprocity in communication networks
Sandeep Chowdhary, Elsa Andres, Adriana Manna, Luka Blagojevi\'c,, Leonardo Di Gaetano, Gerardo I\~niguez

TL;DR
This paper investigates the temporal patterns of reciprocity in human communication networks across various channels, revealing the role of memory and interaction sequences in fostering social cohesion and cooperation.
Contribution
It introduces new measures of reciprocity based on interaction timing and demonstrates how memory influences reciprocal behavior in communication networks.
Findings
Memory significantly contributes to reciprocity levels.
Reciprocal and non-reciprocal networks show distinct roles.
Models incorporating memory replicate empirical reciprocity patterns.
Abstract
Human communication, the essence of collective social phenomena ranging from small-scale organizations to worldwide online platforms, features intense reciprocal interactions between members in order to achieve stability, cohesion, and cooperation in social networks. While high levels of reciprocity are well known in aggregated communication data, temporal patterns of reciprocal information exchange have received far less attention. Here we propose measures of reciprocity based on the time ordering of interactions and explore them in data from multiple communication channels, including calls, messaging and social media. By separating each channel into reciprocal and non-reciprocal temporal networks, we find persistent trends that point to the distinct roles of one-on-one exchange versus information broadcast. We implement several null models of communication activity, which identify…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplex Network Analysis Techniques · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
