Rawlsian Assignments

TL;DR

This paper introduces the Rawlsian assignment rule for indivisible goods, emphasizing egalitarian fairness, and demonstrates its uniqueness, efficiency, and improved egalitarian outcomes over existing methods using real housing data.

Contribution

It proposes a novel Rawlsian assignment rule that prioritizes egalitarian fairness, filling a gap in the literature focused mainly on efficiency and individual fairness.

Findings

Rawlsian rule is unique, efficient, and anonymous.

It significantly improves egalitarian outcomes in housing allocations.

Validated with cooperative housing data, outperforming existing rules.

Abstract

We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals without monetary transfers. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency and individually fair assignments; consequently, egalitarian concerns have been overlooked. Drawing inspiration from the allocation of apartments in housing cooperatives, where families prioritize egalitarianism in assignments, we introduce the concept of Rawlsian assignment. We demonstrate the uniqueness, efficiency and anonymity of the Rawlsian rule. Our findings are validated using cooperative housing preference data, showing significant improvements in egalitarian outcomes over both the probabilistic serial rule and the currently employed rule.